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Theory 
The state regulation of the activities of the natural monopolist JSC “Russian railways” is quite com-
plex and it remains to be a problem with no solution. The issue has become an ambiguous one and  
the state regulation of the most important infrastructure system of the country has shown its flaws when 
the structural reform of railway transport fails [1], which was declared as a liberal one. Both the regula-
tions of the operation and development of behavioral type using the tariff policy (mostly) and the struc-
tural regulations dealing with separation of the rolling stock (wagons and locomotive traction) from the 
railway system (rails and technological complex transportation process services1) are meant. One could 
not turn on competitive mechanisms of the activities of the monopolist and the vertical splitting of for-
mer Ministry of Transportation led to the appearance of the infrastructure monopolist with a mosaic or-
ganizational structure, which activities cannot be considered socially effective. 
To clarify the theoretical moments of the problem we use the classic model of the game “prisoner’s 
dilemma” (e.g., [2]). Suppose that the state government believes that the Federal Antimonopoly Service 
(FAS) is a player-controller and JSC “Russian railways” is a player-natural monopolist; so they do not 
work together, i.e. each of them has their own corporate interests, and they appear to be detrimental to 
the state. The first one sets too low tariffs and does not stabilize the work of the railway corporation; the 
second one increases costs too much and requires a tariff increase to cover them, which contributes to 
the budget deficit. It is necessary for the state with conditionally autonomous activities of the Federal 
Antimonopoly Service and JSC “Russian railways” to reach a compromise between the players. For this 
purpose, each of them gets a game numerical matrix that is developed by government experts; so each of 
them is supposed to evaluate options, ways of the governmental “railway” policy. 
It has been proven [2] that the players acting rationally within the game when the agreement be-
tween them is excluded on the premise that it only can select the Nash optimal (equilibrium) solution, as 
for the Pareto solution which is the best for both players and for the state, it cannot be selected. Let us 
demonstrate this by means of the conventional numerical example. 
Suppose that the regulator and the regulated in our model have the numerical matrix (Table 1). 
 
                                                          
1 Stations, power supply, alerting systems, centralization, blocking, connection, transmission and processing of informa-
tion, control of the movement of trains, buildings and equipment.  
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The problem of the structural reform of railway transport in Russia is being considered in 
the article. Two ways of the reform are suggested, the methodology and results of the expert evalua-
tion of the options are described in detail. There have been shown the experience dealing with 
the use of expert technology; in particular it has to do with the tools of the qualitative and quantita-
tive estimation of the options by using the modified models of so-called Osgood’s semantic differen-
tial which is widely used in the sociology. There are the questionnaires prepared for the examination; 
there are the results of the questionnaire of the expert group of qualified specialists of the Institute of 
Economics and industrial engineering of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Siberian State 
Transport University. When finding a solution there have been used game theory methods, in partic-
ular, the theory of Nash equilibrium strategies, Wald’s maximum criterion, Maximax, Hurwicz's, 
Savage's criterion. The results allow making several significant conclusions which suppose to en-
courage the optimal solution in the structural reform of railway transport in Russia. 
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  JSC “ Russian railways” Inflate the costs Do not inflate the costs 
FA
S Tighten the regulation 4;4 8;0 
Liberalize the regulation 0;8 7;7 
  
In Table 1 the billion figures denote the contingent revenue of the Federal Antimonopoly Service 
(and JSC “Russian railways”) when choosing one or another cooperation strategy. It is clear that acting 
rationally but having only their own interests the players will choose the Nash optimal (equilibrium) so-
lution which would give them 4 billion USD. That is if they act rationally they cannot win 7 billion USD 
in order to reach the optimum according to Pareto – which is better for both players and for the state, 
than the Nash equilibrium. This strategy has no balance; so in order to get 7 the Federal Antimonopoly 
Service should adopt the 2-nd strategy, but JSC “Russian railways” cannot adopt the 1-st one, thus, they 
win 0. Because of this JSC “Russian railways” is afraid to adopt the 2-nd strategy.  
What should the state do for the players to work together? How to convince them to trust each other 
in order to reach the Pareto optimum? In our opinion there are two ways out.  
 
Ways to reform JSC “Russian railways” 
Option 1, proposed by JSC “Russian railways”, – a long-term network contract between the govern-
ment and the corporation. The option is not quite in the market nature, because it encourages the mono-
poly of the corporation as the only one carrier on a single network of the federal railways (Fig. 1), but if 
the contract is made in the right way from the legal and economic point of view, i.e. taking into account 
public and corporate interests and the uncertainty factor of future periods of its realization, then such 
institutional solution has a higher chance to be a Pareto optimal one. 
Option 2 – is only a market one, when it is not considered that the monopoly of Russian railways is 
being natural, the corporation is split at least into three blocks with different management models (Fig. 1 
and Fig. 2). As for the first two block, let us call them JSC “ Russian railways ”-1 и JSC “ Russian rail-
ways ”-2; they become vertically integrated (rolling stock plus rails) private railway companies compet-
ing on the railway network of the European Russia. As for the third block, we call it JSC “Russian rail-
ways” -3, it operates as a state-owned enterprise on railways of Asian Russia, where a tree structure con-
figuration of the network The Trans-Siberian Railway does not allow to use competition as a means of 
improving the commercial viability of rail transport in the near future. 
The logical result of the realization of option 2 should be the close-down of the ministry of transpor-
tation and the transfer of its functions to the new ministry of communication lines of Russia (Fig. 3), but 
not only due to the return to a traditional name. It seems that such decision would be the recognition of  
a higher competence of railway officials in the understanding of the unity of the transport complex of 
the country compared with officials of liberal activities – the ministry of transport of the Russian Federa-
tion that is responsible for the collapse of this system. 
 
Expert evaluation of the options  
The theoretical considerations and hypothetical options concerning further development of the rail-
way reform required the experimental verification. It is known that in the economics full-scale experi-
ments to indentify the effectiveness of theoretical hypotheses dealing with the improvement of its effec-
tiveness are complex and inappropriate, although they are regularly conducted in Russia, to put it mildly, 
not always successfully. One way to avoid the negative effects of live experiments is preliminary modeling 
of relevant projects by all available means of the science and its fields at the moment. After that we 
show our experience of using expert technology, specifically tools of qualitative and quantitative evalua-
tion of the options formulated above with the help of a modified model of so-called Osgood’s semantic 
differential widely used in sociology [4]. 
The expert group was formed from the qualified specialists of the Institute of Economics and indu-
strial engineering of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Siberian State Transport University and 
there  has  been  developed a questionnaire, which was filled in by each expert during the interview with  
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Fig. 2. JSC “Russian railways”-1 and JSC “Russian railways”-2:  






Fig. 3. The new ministry of railways as a regulator activity of JSC “Russian railways”-1,  
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a representative of the development team. Here below there are the questionnaires as certain tools of  
the expert analysis and synthesis which are filled in by all experts in front of the interviewer. The sign + 
in the relevant boxes at the intersections of lines and column denotes answers of one of the experts  
during personal interviews, and the figures in the column “priorities” denote the relative importance in  
the ordinal scale (according to experts’ opinion) of problems the solution of which was initially presented 
as the purpose of the structural reform of the railway transport2. Thus, there were 7 questionnaires3.  
The data of the questionnaires with experts’ opinions were analyzed by means of ORDEX and  
Excel in order to transfer results from the ordinal scale into the quantity one. The examination was car-
ried out in three rounds. Concordance coefficients that describe the consistency of expert judgment [6] 
turned out to be too high in all evaluation procedures, so that one more examination was unnecessary. 
In the first round the experts were proposed to fill in the questionnaire during the personal interview 
with the developer of this survey discussing the next development scenario of the economy in Russia. 
Scenario 1: “Russia is a federal state with the dominant role of the Centre and socially oriented state 
regulation of the competitive economy”. 
In the second round it was proposed to carry out the similar assessment in this scenario. 
Scenario 2: “Russia is a federal state with a coordinating and consultative role of the Centre and 
with the state regulation of the market that focused on the interests of big capital”. 
In the third round it was supposed that a different scenario was supposed to be realized.  
Scenario 3: “Russia is a unitary state with a rigid vertical authority, provincial government and state 
capitalism”. 
At the end of the examination procedures and “digital conversion” of the questionnaires there was 
formed a numeric evaluation matrix (see Table 1) and using the criteria of the decision theory used for 
“discovering” some uncertainty in the game with “nature” there was identified the option chosen by  
the team of experts from alternatives of the development of the railway reform. Under “nature” that ge-
nerates scenarios 1–3 the term “non-stationary economy” in Russia in the transition period was meant, 
when one or another scenario (of the external environment for evaluated alternatives) is hardly predictable. 
To clarify the procedure of “digital conversion” of individual questionnaires that reflect the judg-
ments of experts in Tables 2 and 3 there are answers of one of the experts as an example. 
The assessment order of importance of alternatives (column “priorities” in Tables 2 and 3) and  
the expert evaluation were analyzed with ORDEX software that transfers ordinal assessment into a nu-
merical scale, which according to the language of the system analysis means the determination of  
the coefficients of relative importance of the discussed problem. In this case (scenario 1) the vector of 
the coefficients of relative importance, which is the same for Tables 2 and 3, looks like: 
{0.27; 0.45; 0.14; 0.14},  
reflecting (according to the experts) the fact that in Scenario 1 problems of the further development of 
the reform JSC “Russian railways” have the coefficients of relative importance that are put in curly 
brackets. To be precise: economic problem– 0.27; social problem – 0.45; technical and technological 
problem – 0.14; potential for the future – 0.14. These components of the vector of the coefficients of 
relative importance play the role of coefficients in the multidimensional function of subjective utility 
which is the criterion of comparative preference of options [7]. 
Then there were indentified subjective indicators of the degree of the positive (effectiveness) of op-
tions to deal with the problems in the context of each aspect and assuming that these aspects are equally 
important in all problems. Thus, in Table 2 there is only one sign “+” at the intersection of lines. The in-
crease in public efficiency of railways and column “Very Positive” mean that the solution of the problem 
deserves 6 points in a seven-point scale and the aspect itself possesses the importance (0.27 · 0.5). 
 
Questionnaire for the expertise of the structural reform development of railway transport  
(The first round of the expertise, the scenario 1) 
A question to the expert: How would you assess the impact of variant 1 of the structural reform de-
velopment of railway transport in Russia on solving the following problems? 
                                                          
2 http://rzd.ru/static/public/ru?STRUCTURE_ID=1314& 
3 Specialists who had publications on this topic in local and international journals were taking part in this pilot examina-
tion on an anonymous basis. Based on an analysis of the procedures and the results of this examination there is an additional 
survey with an expanded list of closed questions of a questionnaire, an increased number of experts and modified tools. 
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7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
2 Economic 1. An Increase of public efficiency  of railways  +      
  2. An increase of commercial effec-tiveness of railways   +     
1 Social 3. Creating conditions for staff motiva-tion for effective work +       
  4. Creating conditions for management motivation for effective work   +     
3 Technological 5. An increase of the average speed of passenger and freight transportation   +     




for the future 
7. Sustainable development of the rail-
way infrastructure (investment policy) +       
  
8. Ensuring the regular updating  
the rolling stock and electronic logis-
tics support (investment policy) 
+       
 
A question to the expert: How would you assess the impact of variant 2 of the structural reform de-
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2 Economic 1. An Increase of public efficiency  of railways   +     
  2. An increase of commercial effec-tiveness of railways +       
1 Social 3. Creating conditions for staff motiva-tion for effective work   +     
  4. Creating conditions for management motivation for effective work  +      
3 Technological 5. An increase of the average speed of passenger and freight transportation   +     




for the future 
7. Sustainable development of the rail-
way infrastructure (investment policy)  +      
  
8. Ensuring the regular updating  
the rolling stock and electronic logis-
tics support (investment policy) 
  +     
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The same procedure is repeated at all columns and lines in the Tables 2 and 3, and then the num-
ber values of the function of subjective utility are formed, considered 2 compared variants by experts. 
In the example, they are as follows. 
For variant 1 in scenario 1: 
0,27 · 0.5 · 6 + 0.27 · 0.5 · 5 + 0.45 · 0.5 · 7 + 0.45 · 0.5 · 5 + 0.14 · 0.5 · 5 + 0.14 · 0.5 · 6 + 
+ 0.14 · 0.5 · 7 + 0.14 · 0.5 · 7 = 5.935. 
For variant 2 in scenario 2: 
0.27 · 0.5 · 5 + 0.27 · 0.5 · 7 + 0.45 · 0.5 · 5 + 0.45 · 0.5 · 6 + 0.14 · 0.5 · 5 + 
+ 0.14 · 0.5 · 6   + 0.14 · 0.5 · 6 + 0.14 · 0.5 · 5 = 5.635. 
Therefore, according to the opinion of one of the experts, recorded in the questionnaire of the first 
round of expertise: variant1in scenario 1 is more preferable than variant 2 (5.935 > 5.635). 
However, seven experts participated in the expertise, and it was important to identify collective uti-
lity function of compared variants, and then using it to determine the most preferable variant in the sce-
narios, the probability of actualization of which was considered as unknown in the objective and subjec-
tive meanings. Fundamental uncertainty “was revealed” due to consolidation information of question-
naires in the elements of the strategic assessment matrix (Table 4). Elements (outcomes) contained  
the value of collective (ordinal) utility function of variants 1 and 2 in the scenarios 1–3, and the prefera-




                                             Scenarios 
   Variants 1 2 3 
1 1 2 1 
2 2 1 2 
 
By Wald criterion (an utmost care), the most preferable variant is variant 1: a structural reform of 
developing railway transport in Russia in the case of the conclusion a contract between the state regula-
tor and JSC “Russian railways”. 
By Maximax (a gambler), Savage and Hurwitz (at a level of pessimism α = 0.66) criteria, variants 1 
and 2 are equally preferable.  
By Bayesian and Laplace criteria, the analysis was not held on the premise: in the case of funda-
mental uncertainty these criteria are not adaptable. 
 
Conclusion 
1. The gradualist approach when the reform of critical infrastructure industry in the country is held 
quasi evolutionarily that means gradually and according to experts it is estimated positively. 
2. However, such estimation can stay in the future only if the state regulator concludes agreements 
excluding the opportunistic behavior of the Contracting Parties with JSC “Russian Railways”. 
3. According to the analysis, compared variants are equally preferable by all other criteria (except 
Wald criterion) that is: 
 variants and scenarios should be detailed while study with a view to enhancing their visibility for 
the experts; 
 the category “unstructured” should be transferred to the category “small structured” i.e. the qualit-
ative-quantitative; 
 implementation of the first two paragraphs imply layer “reveal” of the source of fundamental un-
certainty and its transferring to the category of probabilistic uncertainty; 
 modern instrumentation system analysis (called neo system [9, 10]) allows you to do this through 
an interdisciplinary approach based on expert knowledge in the field of economic, social, technical 
sciences and their synthesis on the basis of IT-technologies. 
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РЕГУЛИРОВАНИЕ ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТИ ОАО «РЖД»:  
ЭКСПЕРТНАЯ ОЦЕНКА ВАРИАНТОВ СОВЕРШЕНСТВОВАНИЯ 
 
Е.Б. Кибалов  
Институт экономики и организации промышленного производства (ИЭОПП) СО РАН, 
г. Новосибирск 
 
Рассматривается проблема структурного реформирования железнодорожного транспорта 
России. Предлагается 2 варианта реформирования, подробно описывается методика и резуль-
таты экспертной оценки вариантов. Показан опыт использования экспертных технологий, 
конкретно, инструментов качественно-количественной оценки вариантов, с помощью моди-
фицированной модели так называемого семантического дифференциала Ч. Осгуда, широко 
применяемой в социологии. Приведены опросные листы для проведения экспертизы, резуль-
таты анкетирования группы экспертов из состава квалифицированных специалистов Инсти-
тута экономики и организации промышленного производства (ИЭОПП) СО РАН и Сибирско-
го государственного университета путей сообщения (СГУПС). При выборе решения исполь-
зованы методы теории игр, в частности, теория равновесных стратегий Нэша, критерии Валь-
да (максимальной осторожности), максимакса (азартного игрока), Сэвиджа и Гурвица. Полу-
ченные результаты позволяют сделать ряд существенных выводов, которые должны способ-
ствовать выбору оптимального решения при структурном реформировании железнодорожно-
го транспорта России.  
Ключевые слова: железные дороги, реформирование, операционные издержки, перспек-
тивы развития, альтернативы, ожидаемая эффективность. 
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